Transports, identités, territoires / Transport, identities, territories [2018]
Cet ensemble triangulaire puise sa source dans une approche systémique des forces dynamiques animant la société contemporaine.
Les transports ont été depuis l’invention de la roue [1] un moyen de contrôle des territoires par l’État désirant exercer ses prérogatives sur ceux-ci. Les infrastructures ont été notamment développées afin de permettre certes la croissance du commerce mais aussi – et surtout – le déploiement rapide en tous axes de colonnes de soldats : cela était, est et restera la norme pour toute puissance entendant tenir son espace sous contrôle [2].
Il en va de toute civilisation d’accroître le maillage des transports et le maintenir à un niveau suffisant. Sa bonne santé culturelle, économique, sociale, politique, militaire, religieuse, scientifique etc. en dépend. Ce maillage peut être suppléé le cas échéant par des fournisseurs de ressources locales publics et/ou privés. Par extension, l'exploitation du territoire au profit du groupe résident ne peut s'effectuer sans un réseau de transports efficient pour acheminer, transformer et consommer les ressources extraites ou produites.
Le rapport entre identité et territoire est lié par le fait qu'une culture naît en un endroit donné, il n'y a pas d'identité hors sol. L'enrichissement provient quant à lui des échanges permis par le réseau de transports, qu'il soit terrestre, maritime, aérien ou numérique.
L'identité n'est pas un ensemble monolithique ni intangible : c'est une configuration mouvante à travers l'espace et le temps. À l'instar de l'arbre : plus ses racines ont le temps d'être profondes, plus le tronc est vigoureux et les branches multiples.
En outre, c'est une lutte permanente puisque sur le territoire où l'identité s'enracine les forces centripètes s’exercent à la mesure de la présence et l'effectivité des moyens de circulation tenus par la communauté culturelle principale. Une défaillance prolongée, pouvant aboutir à leur retrait, engendre un renforcement des forces centrifuges. Car si ce phénomène - celui de recul ou de disparition des voies de communication - perdure sur un pan du territoire, il exerce sur le long terme une conséquence particulière : il créé une nouvelle identité territoriale ou en ravive une ancienne autrefois supplantée par l'identité dominante.
En effet, dès lors qu’un maillage n’est plus entrenu ou abandonné, le réseau se redéfinit autour d’un ou de plusieurs espaces délimités par des facteurs culturels communs de reconnaissance communautaire, lesquelles communautés doivent disposer d'un réseau de communication adapté à la nouvelle situation de recomposition territoriale. Ainsi, le sentiment d'abandon d'une partie du territoire peut consacrer l'émergence de nouveaux réseaux et partant de là, de nouvelles identités. C'est une reconfiguration qui peut prendre un temps plus ou moins long - avec un passage par une phase d'anarchie - mais qui se définit par la délimitation d'un territoire et d'une communauté partageant un socle de valeurs communes, dont l'opposition à un pouvoir central négligent ou arbitraire à son égard.
Dans ce schéma, tout recul des transports sur un territoire donné provoque l'anomie de la zone touchée, laquelle par extension renforce son autonomie en reconfigurant son propre réseau. Il y a d'ailleurs une réalité dynamique : plus le réseau est centralisé, plus sa gestion et son entretien est rationalisé mais plus conséquent est son coût d'extension et plus réduite est sa capacité de résilience, tandis que la décentralisation du réseau engendre souplesse et réactivité mais hausse du coût des interconnexions et risque de doublon.
Bien évidemment ce réseau de transports peut se connecter à des territoires tiers, cependant la priorité est toujours accordée au développement territorial interne à l’externe. Et ce en toute logique puisqu’il s’agit initialement de se prémunir de toute agression extérieure puis en un second temps, dès que la communauté est enfin rassurée sur sa sécurité, développer les échanges culturels et économiques entre les groupements de membres disséminés sur le territoire sous contrôle. Aucun échange viable (informations) et rentable (commerce de biens) ne peut s'opérer sur un territoire si les voies de communication - matérielles comme immatérielles - ne sont pas sécurisées.
Lorsque le développement d'une communauté sur la maîtrise de son territoire est parvenu à un stade avancé de maturité, elle peut étendre un principe d'extra-territorialité par l'extension de son réseau de transport, notamment lors de l’ouverture de connexions de flux (avec contrepartie sous forme financière voire remise d’un autre produit ou d’un service s’il s’agit de troc) suivie d’une influence plus ou moins conséquente selon l’importance des échanges et du type de ceux-ci (en d’autres termes, il faut raisonner en quantité et qualité). L’activité du réseau diplomatique peut être mise à contribution, de façon plus ou moins prononcée, avec l’appui d’autres services d’État comme les affaires militaires : l’extra-territorialité est un mélange de soft et de hard power [3]. Toutefois, pour que l’influence en terme d’extra-territorialité puisse porter ses fruits, ces réseaux doivent être inscrits dans une stratégie d’influence où la force soutient le bras du commerce et/ou de la justice [4].
Dans les années 1990, la mise en chantier des réseaux de communication, ce que le vice-président américain Al Gore nommait en 1996 les autoroutes de l’information, a garanti aux États-Unis leur domination technologique - et commerciale - dans les années 2000 puis 2010. L’émergence des GAFA (Google Amazon Facebook Apple) puis des NATU (Netflix AirBnB Twitter Uber) dans le sillage d’IBM et de Microsoft a pérennisé la supériorité américaine au reste du monde sans contestation aucune, avec des conséquences substantielles comme le révéla l’ancien espion de la NSA Edward Snowden [5]. Par ce biais, c’est une projection des idéaux civilisationnels et leurs schémas de pensée qui se sont imposés dans les esprits, soit de la population soit de ses élites selon la structure : lorsque l’on supervise le contenant, il est plus simple d’en maîtriser le contenu [6].
Un monde toujours plus connecté n’est pas un monde toujours plus pacifique : il accroit surtout la dépendance à des produits et services et place des pays autrefois isolés à portée d’appétits nouveaux. Ce fut par exemple le cas du Japon qui avait adopté une position d’isolationnisme - le Sakoku – entre 1641 et 1853 : son ouverture forcée (par la canonnière du commodore Perry) aboutit au réveil d’appétits expansionnistes. L’exemple du Japon est aussi symptomatique, et relativement rare, d’un pays forcé de s’ouvrir au commerce international en l’obligeant initialement à importer des produits étrangers mais sachant retourner la situation de sujétion à son avantage. Car les autorités de l’archipel nippon réussirent ultérieurement à tirer parti des échanges commerciaux imposés puis assimiler les codes du système international tout en développant la formation des cadres du pays pour en faire un outil de domination à leur tour. C’est un schéma que la Chine du XXIème siècle semble reproduire avec succès puisque devenue le premier créancier des États-Unis.
Pour les réseaux d’approvisionnement de ressources minières, l’influence externe du pays exportateur doit là encore dépendre d’une stratégie d’influence sous deux formes : soit directement, c’est à dire par la contrainte d’une cessation de fourniture d’un produit essentiel à l’activité économique, énergétique ou militaire du pays importateur (gaz ou terres rares par exemple) soit par l’activisme indirect résultant du fruits de ces échanges (sur le plan culturel ou cultuel par exemple). En l’absence de stratégie, le pays exportateur est susceptible de subir ce l’on nomme le mal hollandais [7] s'il possède une base industrielle ou devenir un État rentier s'il ne possède pas cette base.
À un niveau infranational, les transports ou leur absence, peuvent déterminer l’identité de ceux qui transitent sur un territoire et même renforcer celle de tous les résidents contraints d’y rester.
Ainsi lorsqu’un péage est instauré, le territoire de transit est acquis à ceux qui disposent d’un capital financier suffisant pour l’emprunter. Avec à la clef des avantages justifiant le règlement d’un droit de passage. C’est un axe prioritaire qui établit une classe au sein d’une population d’individus se déplaçant. Le territoire est par ailleurs gardé et surveillé, il n’est pas en libre accès. Moyennant une redevance, le gestionnaire privé de l’espace public gère et entretient un réseau qu’il conditionne au paiement d’une somme basée forfaitairement ou proportionnellement à la distance, nonobstant des majorations plus ou moins sibyllines.
Autre élément infranational, lorsqu’un quartier est déclaré sensible [8], et que l’État avoue à demi-mot qu’il ne peut y exercer toute son autorité, il s’interdit dès lors d’y faire transiter ses propres forces vers ce territoire. Sur celui-ci ne peuvent plus que circuler les véhicules autorisés par les nouveaux maîtres des lieux, dont les occupants sont reconnus comme loyaux ou inoffensifs ou surtout lucratifs. A contrario, toute signalétique d’un service étatique (pompiers, police, ambulance) est visé par des intimidations pouvant aller jusqu’au coup de feu. Il y a un aspect tribal avec la férule d’un chef de village, ou plutôt de quartier, pour gérer l’ensemble territorial. Et partant de cette donne, il y a ceux qui sont du quartier et ceux qui n’en sont pas. Ce rejet, parfois violent, d’une puissance considérée comme concurrente, fait naître au fil du temps un esprit, un sentiment d’appartenance sur des critères divers mais délimité par une zone géographique précise.
De manière identique, lorsque la municipalité d'une métropole entend - sous couvert de préoccupation écologique - mettre à contribution les automobilistes s’acheminant au centre-ville, voire à les exclure en déployant des moyens considérables (systèmes automatisés mobiles ou fixes de reconnaissance en temps réel de plaques minéralogiques), il y a une discrimination visant à déterminer ceux qui sont du bourg et ceux qui sont en dehors. L’habitant du centre-ville se déplace en transport en commun ou à vélo et élargit son horizon par des moyens de transport aérien ou terrestre intercités : il traverse ou survole à grande vitesse ces zones périphériques qu'il ne désire pas cotoyer. Le confort de ces habitants passe par l’expulsion de ce qu’ils considèrent nuisible à leurs poumons comme à leurs yeux, cautionnant un communautarisme ségrégationniste. Dans le même temps, les néo-ruraux, qui sont d'anciens urbains poussés en dehors des centres-villes par précarité socio-économique, subissent une contrainte de mobilité toujours plus forte imposée par une caste politique proche des milieux issus de la métropolisation. Métropolitains pour qui la distance domicile-travail est largement acceptable par les moyens de transport de proximité à disposition, d'autant qu'ils bénéficient de la présence de bassins d'emplois rémunérateurs (centre-villes et zones d'entreprise).
Assez symptomatique est le repeuplement rural observable en France depuis plusieurs années alors que les emplois les plus qualifiés et les plus diversifiés se trouvent à proximité des grands centres urbains. Il y a par cette évolution discernable depuis les années 2000 deux identités territoriales qui se font face et dont le rapport aux transports est cruciale [9].
Paradoxalement, nous en revenons aux origines du véhicule motorisé : pas sur un plan technologique mais sociologique. En effet, comme à la genèse de cette révolution du transport individuel, celui qui possèdera personnellement [10] une automobile et accèdera au centre-ville sera un homme fortuné capable de s’acquitter de taxes diverses, à commencer par un espace de stationnement privatif hors de prix. Il y a dans la droite ligne de cette orientation une diffusion de l’esprit de décroissance et de technophobie très ancrée chez ces nouveaux citadins qui méprisent le pauvre et jalousent le riche tout en étant sécurisés dans leur propre patrimoine. Ceux-ci ne manquent pas d’exhiber le vélo comme objet politique plus que de transport. Une attitude jusqu’au-boutiste confinant au ridicule, non sans une certaine logique malgré tout, lorsqu’ils fustigent l’électromobilité en espace urbain [11]. Ces néo-citadins se reconnaissent entre eux par une certaine uniformisation de la pensée et du mode de vie véhiculés (sic) dans les principales villes contemporaines. Ce qui accentue ce faisant le différentiel avec les populations poussées hors des centres-villes par l’enchérissement du loyer comme des bien et services de proximité.
Comme le rappelait Nicolas Mazzucchi dans son dernier article [12] : « Le territoire s’exploite, il se met en valeur, parfois il se conquiert – l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014 nous le rappelle – mais toujours il se pense et se vit. Le territoire est ainsi avant tout une expérience à la fois intérieure et collective dont le maître mot est identité. ».
L’identité ne peut naître que sur un territoire [13], et les transports lui permettent de se mouvoir plus rapidement au sein de celui-ci, de la renforcer, de la modeler par des apports périphériques mais aussi de s’étendre davantage lors de phases de croissance. Les transports sont un paramètre qui détermine la puissance des forces centripètes et centrifuges tout en façonnant les identités territoriales. Centripète lorsque le noyau de l’identité principale désire contrôler et/ou étendre son territoire, centrifuge lorsque les représentants d’une identité concurrente désirent reconfigurer les connexions logistiques mais aussi d’entrée et de sortie du territoire donné. Et si l’on songe d’office aux voies de circulation, les transports ne sauraient s’y réduire puisqu’il faut y intégrer de façon plus large tout ce qui peut se mouvoir ou être mû sur un plan matériel comme immatériel.
Restreindre, faciliter, interdire, développer des transports produit inéluctablement une organisation spatiale du territoire. La mobilité des échanges, ou son absence, induit à son tour l’évolution de l’identité du territoire.
Pour résumer, le territoire ressort de l’approche géographique, l’identité de l’approche humaine tandis que les transports sont l’élément dynamique - la courroie - entre les deux approches précitées.
[1] Si l’on fait usuellement remonter son origine en Mésopotamie vers 3 500 av. J.C., les découvertes récentes semblent attester d’une existence encore plus précoce dans l’Est de l’Europe, entre la Pologne et l’Ukraine actuelles. Précisons en outre que le montage d’une figure circulaire n’a pas servi qu’à se déplacer au fil des siècles mais aussi à diverses activités comme moudre le grain avec la meule de pierre ou fournir l’heure grâce aux roues dentées et pignons.
[2] Si l’on songe à l’Empire Romain – qui donnera lieu au fameux adage « Tous les chemins mènent à Rome » ainsi qu’à la dénomination de « Mare Nostrum » pour la Méditerranée - il ne faut pas omettre le réseau de l’Empire Inca qui permettait une exploitation et distribution avancée et à grande échelle de ressources agricoles ou même l’Empire Mongol dont l’efficience de la poste força le respect des peuples conquis.
[3] Un pays disposant d’un développement technologique inférieur à ses voisins peut renforcer et améliorer son activité économique et sa défense militaire en investissant dans son système éducatif, dans les centres de recherche et développement et dans l’armature industrielle nationale. Cependant le plus généralement il se fournit directement auprès d’un État pour l’acquisition de biens civils et militaires qu’il ne peut produire lui-même, lui permettant de garantir un niveau d’activité économique suffisant et une défense militaire à niveau mais en se rendant dépendant de l’État fournisseur. Pour pallier à cet effet, la diversification des approvisionnements est souvent recherchée par l’État importateur mais plus la technologie est élevée plus l’offre est réduite voire monopolistique. Bien entendu, il faut aussi prendre en compte l’existence de cartels qui, sur une ressource donnée, peuvent exercer une pression considérable auprès des États clients.
[4] C’est d’ailleurs une des limites des économistes libéraux de prétendre que la guerre peut être remplacée par le commerce puisque le commerce est une continuation de la guerre sur un autre modèle et que les victimes se comptabilisent sous une forme différente. Du reste, une crise commerciale majeure peut aboutir à un conflit conventionnel comme ce fut le cas entre 1839 et 1842 lors la guerre de l’opium entre le Royaume Uni et la Chine impériale. Dans le registre de la justice, le meilleur exemple du principe d’extra-territorialité de lois nationales est l’application du Foreign Corrupt Practices Act depuis 1977 : le département de la justice américain pouvant frapper n’importe quelle société étrangère dès lors qu’un citoyen américain soit concerné et/ou que la monnaie employée pour la corruption soit le dollar ou encore que la société incriminée - ou une de ses filiales - soit cotée en bourse aux États-Unis.
[5] L’ancien contractuel au sein de la NSA, un organisme de sécurité américain, révéla en 2013 que les pratiques de l’agence s’exerçait dans le monde entier y compris à l’encontre d’alliés des États-Unis. Ce cyberespionnage à grande échelle fut facilité par l’emploi d’outils provenant d’entreprises américaines tenues de collaborer avec les agences de renseignement d’État. La collecte massive de données mondiales permettait aux États-Unis de disposer d’un avantage concurrentiel majeur sur les autres pays.
[6] C’est notamment la problématique des câbles maritimes qui relient les continents entre eux, et qui restent sous propriété américaine. Une réalité qui pousse actuellement la Chine a privilégier la pose de nouvelles lignes terrestres à travers l’Asie Centrale pour réduire sa dépendance. La pose puis l’exploitation en février 2018 du câble transatlantique haute performance en fibre optique Marea renforce la méfiance des autorités chinoises en raison de l’implication financière massive de Microsoft et Facebook.
[7] Le mal hollandais provient d’une analyse du rapide enrichissement des Pays Bas suite à la découverte puis exploitation des gisements de gaz de la Mer du Nord dans les années 1960. Le phénomène provoqua une réaction en chaîne : mise en place d’une situation de rente fondée sur cette activité au détriment de la diversité des industries locales ; enchérissement de la devise nationale facilitant les importations de produits et services étrangers mais fragilisant davantage le tissu économique national ; exportation du gaz de la Mer du Nord de moins en moins rentable en raison du renforcement du florin néerlandais puis de l’amenuisement des ressources. Cet enseignement a été étudié par la Norvège qui a tenu à limiter autant que possible ces effets sur sa propre économie, notamment en instaurant un fonds souverain.
[8] En France le Ministère de la Ville distingue plusieurs catégories de quartiers sensibles, les ZUS (Zones d’Urbanisation Sensibles) devenues des QPV (Quartiers Prioritaires de la politique de la Ville), appellation jugée moins discriminante sur la forme et fondée prioritairement sur le niveau de vie et dans une moindre mesure désormais sur les actes délinquants et criminels. Or, ces quartiers souffrent principalement d'un retrait des services publics qui engendre à son tour un retrait des espaces d'activité économique : un engrenage s'effectue avec la mauvaise réputation qui contracte toujours davantage le tissu économique et ce faisant le bassin d'emploi. L'État compensant partiellement et maladroitement le phénomène par des subventions et des habitations rénovées, or la source principale des problèmes de ces quartiers est d'ordre humaine avec des comportements anti-sociaux opérés en toute impunité, fruits du recul de l'autorité de l'État.
[9] Lorsqu'en janvier 2018 l'exécutif français par la voix de son Premier Ministre annonce qu'il réduira la vitesse de 10 km/h sur les axes secondaires en France (soit la bagatelle de 900 000 kilomètres de ruban d'asphalte au bas mot), il attise un ressentiment violent de la part de toute une population vivant en dehors des grands centres urbains. Cette population accuse la nouvelle en l'assimilant à une humiliation et à une restriction à sa liberté de circuler puisque la mesure ne concerne que les ruraux obligés de se déplacer sur de longues distances. D'autant plus incongrue que le Danemark ayant expérimenté cette baisse de vitesse est rapidement revenue en arrière au vu des résultats catastrophiques en matière de sécurité routière et que l'Autriche envisage d'augmenter la vitesse maximale sur les axes autoroutiers.
[10] Le phénomène de partage des biens est symptomatique de ce bouleversement sociétal : depuis l’avènement de la société de consommation de masse, la possession individuelle était la norme et le signe d’une réussite sociale. Le phénomène de l’ubérisation introduit des solutions à la baisse du pouvoir d’achat et au déclassement social par un nouveau paradigme : celui du partage collectif d’un bien individuel soumis à une contrepartie financière. La collectivisation au sein du modèle capitaliste provient de l’affaiblissement de la richesse individuelle malgré les plus louables raisons officielles des acteurs (altruisme, écologisme, découverte de l’autre etc.), plus subie que souhaitée.
[11] Lors de l’organisation du grand prix de Formule E (électrique) à Paris en 2018, la mouvance écologiste s’insurgea envers la mairie quant à la tenue de cet évènement dans la capitale. Or, dans le rapport délivré à cet effet, la FIA Formule E se conforme à l’ISO 20121, norme qui régule les procédures pour un développement durable dans le cadre de l’événementiel.
http://www.fiaformulae.com/en/news/2017/february/formula-e-releases-latest-sustainability-report/
http://www.fiaformulae.com/en/news/2017/february/formula-e-releases-latest-sustainability-report/
[12] Nicolas Mazzucchi, Mondialisation et territoires, Echo Radar, 6 août 2018
http://echoradar.eu/2018/08/06/mondialisation-et-territoires/#more-3883
http://echoradar.eu/2018/08/06/mondialisation-et-territoires/#more-3883
[13] Le nomadisme n’échappe pas à cette règle puisque ce mode de vie impose pour les échanges au sein de la communauté de trouver refuge et pâture sur un territoire donné. Le mouvement perpétuel ne permet pas l’édification d’une culture, seule la stabilité temporelle et spatiale le permet. Dans le cas contraire, il n’existe qu’une communauté d’intérêt (exemple : la défense du groupe d’individus sur le trajet) et non une identité.
This triangular set draws its source from a systemic approach to the dynamic forces driving contemporary society.
Since the invention of the wheel [1], transportation has been a means of controlling territories by the State wishing to exercise its prerogatives over them. Infrastructures have been developed in particular to allow the growth of trade but also - and above all - the rapid deployment in all axes of columns of soldiers: this was, is and will remain the norm for any power intending to keep its space under control [2].
It is up to any civilization to increase the transport network and maintain it at a sufficient level. Its cultural, economic, social, political, military, religious, scientific, etc. health depends on it. This network can be supplemented where appropriate by public and/or private local resource providers. By extension, the exploitation of the territory for the benefit of the resident group cannot be carried out without an efficient transport network to transport, transform and consume the resources extracted or produced.
The relationship between identity and territory is linked by the fact that a culture is born in a given place, there is no identity above ground. Enrichment comes from the exchanges allowed by the transport network, whether land, sea, air or digital.
Identity is not a monolithic or intangible whole: it is a moving configuration through space and time. Like a tree: the deeper its roots have time to be, the more vigorous the trunk and the more numerous the branches.
In addition, it is a permanent struggle since on the territory where identity takes root, centripetal forces are exerted to the extent of the presence and effectiveness of the means of circulation held by the main cultural community. A prolonged failure, which can lead to their withdrawal, leads to a strengthening of centrifugal forces. Because if this phenomenon - that of the decline or disappearance of communication routes - persists in one part of the territory, it has a particular consequence in the long term: it creates a new territorial identity or revives an old one that was once supplanted by the dominant identity.
Since the invention of the wheel [1], transportation has been a means of controlling territories by the State wishing to exercise its prerogatives over them. Infrastructures have been developed in particular to allow the growth of trade but also - and above all - the rapid deployment in all axes of columns of soldiers: this was, is and will remain the norm for any power intending to keep its space under control [2].
It is up to any civilization to increase the transport network and maintain it at a sufficient level. Its cultural, economic, social, political, military, religious, scientific, etc. health depends on it. This network can be supplemented where appropriate by public and/or private local resource providers. By extension, the exploitation of the territory for the benefit of the resident group cannot be carried out without an efficient transport network to transport, transform and consume the resources extracted or produced.
The relationship between identity and territory is linked by the fact that a culture is born in a given place, there is no identity above ground. Enrichment comes from the exchanges allowed by the transport network, whether land, sea, air or digital.
Identity is not a monolithic or intangible whole: it is a moving configuration through space and time. Like a tree: the deeper its roots have time to be, the more vigorous the trunk and the more numerous the branches.
In addition, it is a permanent struggle since on the territory where identity takes root, centripetal forces are exerted to the extent of the presence and effectiveness of the means of circulation held by the main cultural community. A prolonged failure, which can lead to their withdrawal, leads to a strengthening of centrifugal forces. Because if this phenomenon - that of the decline or disappearance of communication routes - persists in one part of the territory, it has a particular consequence in the long term: it creates a new territorial identity or revives an old one that was once supplanted by the dominant identity.
Indeed, as soon as a network is no longer maintained or abandoned, the network is redefined around one or more spaces delimited by common cultural factors of community recognition, which communities must have a communication network adapted to the new situation of territorial recomposition. Thus, the feeling of abandonment of a part of the territory can consecrate the emergence of new networks and from there, new identities. It is a reconfiguration that can take a more or less long time - with a passage through a phase of anarchy - but which is defined by the delimitation of a territory and a community sharing a base of common values, including opposition to a central power that is negligent or arbitrary towards it.
In this scheme, any decline in transport in a given territory causes anomie in the affected area, which by extension strengthens its autonomy by reconfiguring its own network. There is also a dynamic reality: the more centralized the network, the more its management and maintenance are rationalized but the higher its extension cost and the lower its resilience capacity, while the decentralization of the network generates flexibility and responsiveness but increases the cost of interconnections and the risk of duplication.
Of course, this transport network can connect to third-party territories, however, priority is always given to internal and external territorial development. And this is quite logical since it is initially a question of protecting against any external aggression and then, as soon as the community is finally reassured about its security, developing cultural and economic exchanges between groups of members scattered across the territory under control. No viable (information) and profitable (trade in goods) exchange can take place in a territory if the communication channels - both material and immaterial - are not secure.
In this scheme, any decline in transport in a given territory causes anomie in the affected area, which by extension strengthens its autonomy by reconfiguring its own network. There is also a dynamic reality: the more centralized the network, the more its management and maintenance are rationalized but the higher its extension cost and the lower its resilience capacity, while the decentralization of the network generates flexibility and responsiveness but increases the cost of interconnections and the risk of duplication.
Of course, this transport network can connect to third-party territories, however, priority is always given to internal and external territorial development. And this is quite logical since it is initially a question of protecting against any external aggression and then, as soon as the community is finally reassured about its security, developing cultural and economic exchanges between groups of members scattered across the territory under control. No viable (information) and profitable (trade in goods) exchange can take place in a territory if the communication channels - both material and immaterial - are not secure.
When the development of a community on the control of its territory has reached an advanced stage of maturity, it can extend a principle of extra-territoriality by extending its transport network, in particular when opening flow connections (with compensation in the form of finance or even the delivery of another product or service if it is a barter) followed by a more or less significant influence depending on the importance of the exchanges and their type (in other words, it is necessary to reason in terms of quantity and quality). The activity of the diplomatic network can be put to use, to a greater or lesser extent, with the support of other State services such as military affairs: extra-territoriality is a mixture of soft and hard power [3]. However, for influence in terms of extra-territoriality to bear fruit, these networks must be part of an influence strategy where force supports the arm of commerce and/or justice [4].
In the 1990s, the construction of communication networks, what American Vice President Al Gore called in 1996 the information highways, guaranteed the United States their technological - and commercial - domination in the 2000s and then 2010s. The emergence of GAFA (Google Amazon Facebook Apple) and then NATU (Netflix AirBnB Twitter Uber) in the wake of IBM and Microsoft has perpetuated American superiority over the rest of the world without any dispute, with substantial consequences as revealed by the former NSA spy Edward Snowden [5]. In this way, it is a projection of civilizational ideals and their thought patterns that have imposed themselves in the minds of either the population or its elites depending on the structure: when you supervise the container, it is easier to control its content [6].
An increasingly connected world is not an increasingly peaceful world: it mainly increases dependence on products and services and places formerly isolated countries within reach of new appetites. This was the case, for example, of Japan, which had adopted a position of isolationism - the Sakoku - between 1641 and 1853: its forced opening (by Commodore Perry's gunboat) led to the reawakening of expansionist appetites. The example of Japan is also symptomatic, and relatively rare, of a country forced to open up to international trade by initially forcing it to import foreign products but knowing how to turn the situation of subjection to its advantage. Because the authorities of the Japanese archipelago subsequently succeeded in taking advantage of the imposed trade and then assimilating the codes of the international system while developing the training of the country's executives to use it as a tool of domination in turn. This is a pattern that 21st century China seems to be reproducing successfully since it has become the United States' largest creditor.
In the 1990s, the construction of communication networks, what American Vice President Al Gore called in 1996 the information highways, guaranteed the United States their technological - and commercial - domination in the 2000s and then 2010s. The emergence of GAFA (Google Amazon Facebook Apple) and then NATU (Netflix AirBnB Twitter Uber) in the wake of IBM and Microsoft has perpetuated American superiority over the rest of the world without any dispute, with substantial consequences as revealed by the former NSA spy Edward Snowden [5]. In this way, it is a projection of civilizational ideals and their thought patterns that have imposed themselves in the minds of either the population or its elites depending on the structure: when you supervise the container, it is easier to control its content [6].
An increasingly connected world is not an increasingly peaceful world: it mainly increases dependence on products and services and places formerly isolated countries within reach of new appetites. This was the case, for example, of Japan, which had adopted a position of isolationism - the Sakoku - between 1641 and 1853: its forced opening (by Commodore Perry's gunboat) led to the reawakening of expansionist appetites. The example of Japan is also symptomatic, and relatively rare, of a country forced to open up to international trade by initially forcing it to import foreign products but knowing how to turn the situation of subjection to its advantage. Because the authorities of the Japanese archipelago subsequently succeeded in taking advantage of the imposed trade and then assimilating the codes of the international system while developing the training of the country's executives to use it as a tool of domination in turn. This is a pattern that 21st century China seems to be reproducing successfully since it has become the United States' largest creditor.
For mineral resource supply networks, the external influence of the exporting country must again depend on an influence strategy in two forms: either directly, that is to say by the constraint of a cessation of supply of a product essential to the economic, energy or military activity of the importing country (gas or rare earths for example) or by indirect activism resulting from the fruits of these exchanges (on the cultural or religious level for example). In the absence of a strategy, the exporting country is likely to suffer what is called Dutch disease [7] if it has an industrial base or to become a rentier state if it does not have this base.
At a subnational level, transport or its absence can determine the identity of those who transit through a territory and even reinforce that of all residents forced to remain there.
Thus when a toll is introduced, the transit territory is acquired by those who have sufficient financial capital to use it. With the key advantages justifying the payment of a right of way. It is a priority axis that establishes a class within a population of individuals moving. The territory is also guarded and monitored, it is not freely accessible. For a fee, the private manager of the public space manages and maintains a network that he conditions on the payment of a sum based on a flat rate or proportionally to the distance, notwithstanding more or less sibylline increases.
Another subnational element, when a district is declared sensitive [8], and the State half-admits that it cannot exercise all its authority there, it then prohibits itself from having its own forces transit there towards this territory. On this territory, only vehicles authorized by the new masters of the place can circulate, whose occupants are recognized as loyal or harmless or especially lucrative. Conversely, any signage of a state service (fire brigade, police, ambulance) is targeted by intimidation that can go as far as gunshots. There is a tribal aspect with the rule of a village chief, or rather a district chief, to manage the entire territory. And based on this, there are those who are from the district and those who are not. This rejection, sometimes violent, of a power considered as a competitor, gives rise over time to a spirit, a feeling of belonging based on various criteria but delimited by a specific geographical area.
Similarly, when the municipality of a metropolis intends - under the cover of ecological concerns - to make motorists heading to the city centre contribute, or even to exclude them by deploying considerable resources (mobile or fixed automated systems for real-time recognition of license plates), there is discrimination aimed at determining those who are from the town and those who are outside. The city centre resident travels by public transport or by bicycle and broadens his horizons by intercity air or land transport: he crosses or flies over these peripheral areas at high speed that he does not wish to rub shoulders with. The comfort of these residents involves the expulsion of what they consider harmful to their lungs as well as their eyes, endorsing a segregationist communitarianism. At the same time, the neo-rurals, who are former urban dwellers pushed out of city centres by socio-economic insecurity, are subject to an ever-increasing mobility constraint imposed by a political caste close to the environments resulting from metropolitanisation. Metropolitan residents for whom the distance between home and work is largely acceptable due to the local means of transport available, especially as they benefit from the presence of remunerative employment areas (town centers and business zones).
At a subnational level, transport or its absence can determine the identity of those who transit through a territory and even reinforce that of all residents forced to remain there.
Thus when a toll is introduced, the transit territory is acquired by those who have sufficient financial capital to use it. With the key advantages justifying the payment of a right of way. It is a priority axis that establishes a class within a population of individuals moving. The territory is also guarded and monitored, it is not freely accessible. For a fee, the private manager of the public space manages and maintains a network that he conditions on the payment of a sum based on a flat rate or proportionally to the distance, notwithstanding more or less sibylline increases.
Another subnational element, when a district is declared sensitive [8], and the State half-admits that it cannot exercise all its authority there, it then prohibits itself from having its own forces transit there towards this territory. On this territory, only vehicles authorized by the new masters of the place can circulate, whose occupants are recognized as loyal or harmless or especially lucrative. Conversely, any signage of a state service (fire brigade, police, ambulance) is targeted by intimidation that can go as far as gunshots. There is a tribal aspect with the rule of a village chief, or rather a district chief, to manage the entire territory. And based on this, there are those who are from the district and those who are not. This rejection, sometimes violent, of a power considered as a competitor, gives rise over time to a spirit, a feeling of belonging based on various criteria but delimited by a specific geographical area.
Similarly, when the municipality of a metropolis intends - under the cover of ecological concerns - to make motorists heading to the city centre contribute, or even to exclude them by deploying considerable resources (mobile or fixed automated systems for real-time recognition of license plates), there is discrimination aimed at determining those who are from the town and those who are outside. The city centre resident travels by public transport or by bicycle and broadens his horizons by intercity air or land transport: he crosses or flies over these peripheral areas at high speed that he does not wish to rub shoulders with. The comfort of these residents involves the expulsion of what they consider harmful to their lungs as well as their eyes, endorsing a segregationist communitarianism. At the same time, the neo-rurals, who are former urban dwellers pushed out of city centres by socio-economic insecurity, are subject to an ever-increasing mobility constraint imposed by a political caste close to the environments resulting from metropolitanisation. Metropolitan residents for whom the distance between home and work is largely acceptable due to the local means of transport available, especially as they benefit from the presence of remunerative employment areas (town centers and business zones).
Quite symptomatic is the rural repopulation that has been observed in France for several years, while the most qualified and diversified jobs are located near large urban centers. Through this discernible evolution since the 2000s, there are two territorial identities that face each other and whose relationship to transport is crucial [9].
Paradoxically, we return to the origins of the motor vehicle: not on a technological level but on a sociological level. Indeed, as at the genesis of this revolution in individual transport, the person who personally owns [10] a car and accesses the city center will be a wealthy man capable of paying various taxes, starting with an overpriced private parking space. In line with this orientation, there is a diffusion of the spirit of degrowth and technophobia deeply rooted in these new city dwellers who despise the poor and envy the rich while being secure in their own heritage. They do not fail to exhibit the bicycle as a political object more than a means of transport. A hardline attitude bordering on the ridiculous, not without a certain logic despite everything, when they castigate electromobility in urban spaces [11]. These neo-urbanites recognize each other by a certain standardization of thought and lifestyle conveyed (sic) in the main contemporary cities. Which in doing so accentuates the difference with the populations pushed out of city centers by the increase in rent as well as local goods and services.
As Nicolas Mazzucchi recalled in his last article [12]: "The territory is exploited, it is enhanced, sometimes it is conquered - the annexation of Crimea in 2014 reminds us of this - but it is always thought and lived. The territory is thus above all an experience that is both internal and collective, the key word of which is identity.".
Identity can only be born in a territory [13], and transport allows it to move more quickly within it, to strengthen it, to shape it through peripheral contributions but also to expand further during growth phases. Transport is a parameter that determines the power of centripetal and centrifugal forces while shaping territorial identities. Centripetal when the core of the main identity wishes to control and/or expand its territory, centrifugal when the representatives of a competing identity wish to reconfigure the logistical connections but also the entry and exit of the given territory. And if we automatically think of traffic routes, transport cannot be reduced to them since it is necessary to integrate in a broader way everything that can move or be moved on a material as well as immaterial level.
Restricting, facilitating, prohibiting, developing transport inevitably produces a spatial organization of the territory. The mobility of trade, or its absence, in turn induces the evolution of the identity of the territory.
To summarize, the territory emerges from the geographical approach, identity from the human approach while transport is the dynamic element - the belt - between the two aforementioned approaches.
Paradoxically, we return to the origins of the motor vehicle: not on a technological level but on a sociological level. Indeed, as at the genesis of this revolution in individual transport, the person who personally owns [10] a car and accesses the city center will be a wealthy man capable of paying various taxes, starting with an overpriced private parking space. In line with this orientation, there is a diffusion of the spirit of degrowth and technophobia deeply rooted in these new city dwellers who despise the poor and envy the rich while being secure in their own heritage. They do not fail to exhibit the bicycle as a political object more than a means of transport. A hardline attitude bordering on the ridiculous, not without a certain logic despite everything, when they castigate electromobility in urban spaces [11]. These neo-urbanites recognize each other by a certain standardization of thought and lifestyle conveyed (sic) in the main contemporary cities. Which in doing so accentuates the difference with the populations pushed out of city centers by the increase in rent as well as local goods and services.
As Nicolas Mazzucchi recalled in his last article [12]: "The territory is exploited, it is enhanced, sometimes it is conquered - the annexation of Crimea in 2014 reminds us of this - but it is always thought and lived. The territory is thus above all an experience that is both internal and collective, the key word of which is identity.".
Identity can only be born in a territory [13], and transport allows it to move more quickly within it, to strengthen it, to shape it through peripheral contributions but also to expand further during growth phases. Transport is a parameter that determines the power of centripetal and centrifugal forces while shaping territorial identities. Centripetal when the core of the main identity wishes to control and/or expand its territory, centrifugal when the representatives of a competing identity wish to reconfigure the logistical connections but also the entry and exit of the given territory. And if we automatically think of traffic routes, transport cannot be reduced to them since it is necessary to integrate in a broader way everything that can move or be moved on a material as well as immaterial level.
Restricting, facilitating, prohibiting, developing transport inevitably produces a spatial organization of the territory. The mobility of trade, or its absence, in turn induces the evolution of the identity of the territory.
To summarize, the territory emerges from the geographical approach, identity from the human approach while transport is the dynamic element - the belt - between the two aforementioned approaches.
[1] While its origin is usually traced back to Mesopotamia around 3,500 BC, recent discoveries seem to attest to an even earlier existence in Eastern Europe, between present-day Poland and Ukraine. It should also be noted that the assembly of a circular figure was not only used to move around over the centuries, but also for various activities such as grinding grain with a millstone or telling the time using cogwheels and pinions.
[2] If we think of the Roman Empire – which gave rise to the famous adage “All roads lead to Rome” as well as the name “Mare Nostrum” for the Mediterranean – we must not forget the network of the Inca Empire, which allowed advanced and large-scale exploitation and distribution of agricultural resources, or even the Mongol Empire, whose efficient postal system commanded the respect of the conquered peoples.
[3] A country with a lower technological development than its neighbors can strengthen and improve its economic activity and military defense by investing in its education system, in research and development centers and in the national industrial framework. However, most generally it supplies itself directly from a State for the acquisition of civil and military goods that it cannot produce itself, allowing it to guarantee a sufficient level of economic activity and a military defense at a level but by making itself dependent on the supplier State. To overcome this effect, the diversification of supplies is often sought by the importing State but the higher the technology, the more the supply is reduced or even monopolistic. Of course, it is also necessary to take into account the existence of cartels which, on a given resource, can exert considerable pressure on client States.
[4] It is also one of the limits of liberal economists to claim that war can be replaced by trade since trade is a continuation of war on another model and the victims are counted in a different form. Moreover, a major trade crisis can lead to a conventional conflict as was the case between 1839 and 1842 during the Opium War between the United Kingdom and Imperial China. In the justice system, the best example of the principle of extraterritoriality of national laws is the application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act since 1977: the American Department of Justice can strike any foreign company as long as an American citizen is involved and/or the currency used for corruption is the dollar or the company incriminated - or one of its subsidiaries - is listed on the stock exchange in the United States.
[5] The former contractor within the NSA, an American security agency, revealed in 2013 that the agency's practices were carried out worldwide, including against allies of the United States. This large-scale cyber espionage was facilitated by the use of tools from American companies required to collaborate with state intelligence agencies. The massive collection of global data gave the United States a major competitive advantage over other countries.
[6] This is particularly the problem of maritime cables that connect continents, and which remain under American ownership. A reality that is currently pushing China to prioritize the laying of new land lines across Central Asia to reduce its dependence. The laying and then operation in February 2018 of the high-performance transatlantic fiber optic cable Marea reinforces the mistrust of the Chinese authorities due to the massive financial involvement of Microsoft and Facebook.
[7] Dutch disease comes from an analysis of the rapid enrichment of the Netherlands following the discovery and exploitation of North Sea gas deposits in the 1960s. The phenomenon caused a chain reaction: establishment of a situation of rent based on this activity to the detriment of the diversity of local industries; appreciation of the national currency facilitating imports of foreign products and services but further weakening the national economic fabric; export of North Sea gas becoming less and less profitable due to the strengthening of the Dutch guilder and then the dwindling of resources. This lesson was studied by Norway, which was keen to limit these effects on its own economy as much as possible, in particular by establishing a sovereign wealth fund.
[2] If we think of the Roman Empire – which gave rise to the famous adage “All roads lead to Rome” as well as the name “Mare Nostrum” for the Mediterranean – we must not forget the network of the Inca Empire, which allowed advanced and large-scale exploitation and distribution of agricultural resources, or even the Mongol Empire, whose efficient postal system commanded the respect of the conquered peoples.
[3] A country with a lower technological development than its neighbors can strengthen and improve its economic activity and military defense by investing in its education system, in research and development centers and in the national industrial framework. However, most generally it supplies itself directly from a State for the acquisition of civil and military goods that it cannot produce itself, allowing it to guarantee a sufficient level of economic activity and a military defense at a level but by making itself dependent on the supplier State. To overcome this effect, the diversification of supplies is often sought by the importing State but the higher the technology, the more the supply is reduced or even monopolistic. Of course, it is also necessary to take into account the existence of cartels which, on a given resource, can exert considerable pressure on client States.
[4] It is also one of the limits of liberal economists to claim that war can be replaced by trade since trade is a continuation of war on another model and the victims are counted in a different form. Moreover, a major trade crisis can lead to a conventional conflict as was the case between 1839 and 1842 during the Opium War between the United Kingdom and Imperial China. In the justice system, the best example of the principle of extraterritoriality of national laws is the application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act since 1977: the American Department of Justice can strike any foreign company as long as an American citizen is involved and/or the currency used for corruption is the dollar or the company incriminated - or one of its subsidiaries - is listed on the stock exchange in the United States.
[5] The former contractor within the NSA, an American security agency, revealed in 2013 that the agency's practices were carried out worldwide, including against allies of the United States. This large-scale cyber espionage was facilitated by the use of tools from American companies required to collaborate with state intelligence agencies. The massive collection of global data gave the United States a major competitive advantage over other countries.
[6] This is particularly the problem of maritime cables that connect continents, and which remain under American ownership. A reality that is currently pushing China to prioritize the laying of new land lines across Central Asia to reduce its dependence. The laying and then operation in February 2018 of the high-performance transatlantic fiber optic cable Marea reinforces the mistrust of the Chinese authorities due to the massive financial involvement of Microsoft and Facebook.
[7] Dutch disease comes from an analysis of the rapid enrichment of the Netherlands following the discovery and exploitation of North Sea gas deposits in the 1960s. The phenomenon caused a chain reaction: establishment of a situation of rent based on this activity to the detriment of the diversity of local industries; appreciation of the national currency facilitating imports of foreign products and services but further weakening the national economic fabric; export of North Sea gas becoming less and less profitable due to the strengthening of the Dutch guilder and then the dwindling of resources. This lesson was studied by Norway, which was keen to limit these effects on its own economy as much as possible, in particular by establishing a sovereign wealth fund.
[8] In France, the Ministry of the City distinguishes several categories of sensitive neighborhoods, the ZUS (Sensitive Urbanization Zones) which have become QPV (Priority Neighborhoods of the City Policy), a name considered less discriminatory in form and based primarily on the standard of living and to a lesser extent now on delinquent and criminal acts. However, these neighborhoods suffer mainly from a withdrawal of public services which in turn leads to a withdrawal of spaces for economic activity: a spiral is set in motion with the bad reputation which increasingly contracts the economic fabric and in doing so the employment pool. The State partially and clumsily compensates for the phenomenon with subsidies and renovated housing, but the main source of the problems in these neighborhoods is of a human nature with anti-social behavior carried out with complete impunity, the fruit of the decline of State authority.
[9] When in January 2018 the French executive, through its Prime Minister, announced that it would reduce the speed limit by 10 km/h on secondary roads in France (a mere 900,000 kilometres of asphalt strip at the very least), it stirred up violent resentment among an entire population living outside major urban centres. This population accused the news of humiliation and a restriction on its freedom of movement, since the measure only concerned rural dwellers who were forced to travel long distances. This was all the more incongruous given that Denmark, which had experimented with this speed reduction, quickly backtracked in view of the disastrous results in terms of road safety, and that Austria was considering increasing the maximum speed limit on motorways.
[10] The phenomenon of sharing goods is symptomatic of this societal upheaval: since the advent of the mass consumer society, individual possession was the norm and the sign of social success. The phenomenon of uberization introduces solutions to the decline in purchasing power and social downgrading through a new paradigm: that of the collective sharing of an individual good subject to financial compensation. Collectivization within the capitalist model comes from the weakening of individual wealth despite the most laudable official reasons of the actors (altruism, environmentalism, discovery of the other, etc.), more suffered than desired.
[11] During the organization of the Formula E (electric) Grand Prix in Paris in 2018, the environmental movement protested against the city hall regarding the holding of this event in the capital. However, in the report issued for this purpose, FIA Formula E complies with ISO 20121, a standard that regulates procedures for sustainable development in the context of events.
http://www.fiaformulae.com/en/news/2017/february/formula-e-releases-latest-sustainability-report/
[12] Nicolas Mazzucchi, Mondialisation et territoires, Echo Radar, August 6, 2018
http://echoradar.eu/2018/08/06/mondialisation-et-territoires/#more-3883
[13] Nomadism is no exception to this rule since this way of life requires that exchanges within the community find refuge and pasture in a given territory. Perpetual motion does not allow the building of a culture, only temporal and spatial stability allows it. Otherwise, there is only a community of interest (example: the defense of the group of individuals on the route) and not an identity.
[9] When in January 2018 the French executive, through its Prime Minister, announced that it would reduce the speed limit by 10 km/h on secondary roads in France (a mere 900,000 kilometres of asphalt strip at the very least), it stirred up violent resentment among an entire population living outside major urban centres. This population accused the news of humiliation and a restriction on its freedom of movement, since the measure only concerned rural dwellers who were forced to travel long distances. This was all the more incongruous given that Denmark, which had experimented with this speed reduction, quickly backtracked in view of the disastrous results in terms of road safety, and that Austria was considering increasing the maximum speed limit on motorways.
[10] The phenomenon of sharing goods is symptomatic of this societal upheaval: since the advent of the mass consumer society, individual possession was the norm and the sign of social success. The phenomenon of uberization introduces solutions to the decline in purchasing power and social downgrading through a new paradigm: that of the collective sharing of an individual good subject to financial compensation. Collectivization within the capitalist model comes from the weakening of individual wealth despite the most laudable official reasons of the actors (altruism, environmentalism, discovery of the other, etc.), more suffered than desired.
[11] During the organization of the Formula E (electric) Grand Prix in Paris in 2018, the environmental movement protested against the city hall regarding the holding of this event in the capital. However, in the report issued for this purpose, FIA Formula E complies with ISO 20121, a standard that regulates procedures for sustainable development in the context of events.
http://www.fiaformulae.com/en/news/2017/february/formula-e-releases-latest-sustainability-report/
[12] Nicolas Mazzucchi, Mondialisation et territoires, Echo Radar, August 6, 2018
http://echoradar.eu/2018/08/06/mondialisation-et-territoires/#more-3883
[13] Nomadism is no exception to this rule since this way of life requires that exchanges within the community find refuge and pasture in a given territory. Perpetual motion does not allow the building of a culture, only temporal and spatial stability allows it. Otherwise, there is only a community of interest (example: the defense of the group of individuals on the route) and not an identity.