China-Russia, an unnatural alliance ? [2023]

Update 2024 : The BRICS+ summit held in Kazan - from October 22 to 24, 2024 - made it possible to confirm a recomposition of the world in progress. While it is still far too early to predict long-term success, several advances have been made: whether it be a preliminary agreement on the border dispute between India and China or the BRICS Clear trade compensation system, as well as by 2025 (at best), a payment system, BRICS Pay. Host of this edition, Russian leader Vladimir Putin had every interest in moving the various members forward on issues impacting his country since 2014, and in bringing about financial autonomy for this group of countries. But it was also the confirmation of the Russian-Chinese understanding (as well as the Russian-Indian understanding) which facilitated exchanges and the establishment of specifications accepted by all. Among the other projects listed, it is worth noting the long-term desire to create a precious metals exchange for members of the BRICS club. 

The conflict in Ukraine has crystallized geopolitical oppositions. To the point that Russia and China are now even more closely linked by their strategic partnership, making the Western bloc fear a shift by the Chinese authorities towards active military support in favor of their large northern neighbor. Some commentators have seen fit to soften this alliance, deemed unnatural and counterproductive for China. However, it is part of a historical logic of appeasement and strengthening of ties for several decades. The fear of the West is real and profound: the leading industrial power in synergy with the leading energy power, it is a considerable geostrategic group. Hence the emotion of some commentators regarding this tightening of relations. First of all, if we had wanted to prevent China from getting too close to Russia, we would have had to tie Russia to Europe, in particular by taking advantage of the so-called liberal period of Vladimir Putin and his outstretched hand in February 2007 at the Munich conference regarding a common European security offer. Security that was not only understood on the military level but also on the energy level.

The lack of understanding of Russian specificity by Europeans is, it is true, not new - we must reread 19th century texts such as La Russie en 1839 by Astolphe de Custine (1790-1857) - but in doing so it has prevented any understanding of the geopolitical movement then progressing since the 2000s. Added to this lack of understanding is the strategic objective of the big cousin of America who has absolutely no interest in Europe being built from Lisbon to Vladivostok, following in this the principles set out by the Anglo-Saxon strategists Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947), Alfred Mahan (1840-1914) and Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943). This is already the first pitfall, that of having discredited Russia by refusing to take into consideration its aspirations (joining the European family) and its concerns (the proliferation of American bases in the Warsaw Pact area up to the former Soviet socialist republics). An intelligence that was nevertheless possessed in his time by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), who had understood well that it was necessary to anchor Russia at the heart of the European stability policy while avoiding assimilating it to a European country like the others.

Secondly, Western chancelleries tend to overestimate their own influence in these 2020s : to date, China needs the world less than the world needs China as the world's leading factory, and even more so since the latter is progressing very rapidly in the tertiary sector. However, the initial deal in the late 1990s and early 2000s was to relocate Western industries to produce more cheaply and pollute further away while retaining headquarters, research and development units and service activities in the original territory. This falsely ingenious policy has devitalized European countries, and to a lesser extent the United States, while boosting China with methods, machine tools, production units and ad hoc training. Now, let us remember that China – also called the Middle Kingdom – remained at the center of the world economy for several centuries while firmly controlling the entries/exits on its territory, at the level of the Pearl River near Canton in a place called Thirteen Factories by the English merchants or Shísān Háng by the Chinese merchants. Even if the Spanish Empire of the 16th century (Empresa de China) and the United Kingdom of the 18th century (the East India Company and the James Flint affair of 1759) had for a time toyed with the project of a China under trusteeship, or at least under limited control, the two European powers were nevertheless obliged to abandon their plan. An objective that would only partially come about in the 19th century until the first half of the 20th (from the first Opium War of 1839-1842 to the advent of Communist China in 1949) with the territorial concessions linked to the railways followed by the trauma of the sack of the Summer Palace, or Yuanmingyuan, in 1860 when priceless works, objects of art and ornaments disappeared, either destroyed or sold. The Chinese, like the Russians, have memories and the humiliations of past centuries have not been forgotten.

Then, a Russia drained of blood under Western control, or worse, fragmented into several independent regions as desired by the Polish-American advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017), would be unacceptable to the Chinese authorities. Although this friendship is welded by geopolitical circumstances – distrust of the American superpower to be more precise – China nevertheless has good relations with Russia, especially since the last territorial dispute over Damanski/Zhenbao Island was solemnly settled a few years ago (a long-standing border dispute that almost ended in a general war between the two communist powers in 1969). Chinese strategists know that a recapture of the island of Taiwan cannot be achieved under the threat of a northern neighbor opposed to its interests. Hence the difficulty in believing that China could remain inert in the event of a reversal of the course of the conflict with Ukraine by the ever more intrusive and increasing contribution of NATO equipment and personnel to the point of threatening the integrity of the Russian Federation. Several members of the Chinese senior administration have highlighted the hypocrisy of Europeans and Americans regarding the aid provided to Ukraine at the same time as their fear of Chinese aid provided to Russia. 

Finally, some are asking that China try to renew ties with the Europeans. But where could there have been a break, whether diplomatic, technological or commercial? On the contrary, it must be understood that in the little game of industrialization, Chinese engineers no longer have much to learn from Westerners (cf. electric vehicles which are of equal quality - if not superior for some models already - to their European and American counterparts with a lower cost in addition) and that they have a phenomenal domestic market of several hundred million individuals. The export of Chinese products and services represents 15.1% of the world market, with a tipping point that can be dated to 2009 when China overtook Germany as the world's leading exporter. Since then, the trend has not reversed, quite the contrary, to the point of considering that the gap has become truly abysmal between China and European states. It is important to recall the figures for 2023: China's GDP $22 billion; Germany's GDP $4 billion; United Kingdom's GDP $3.5 billion; France's GDP $2.8 billion. And since the European Union has become bogged down in counterproductive sanctions against one of its main energy suppliers, namely Russia (let us remember that the basis of modern growth is easily accessible, abundant and low-cost energy), it goes without saying that China, and India to a lesser extent (which is nibbling away at market share, to the point of threatening the United Kingdom's place as the world's 6th largest exporter), are gorging themselves on the strategic errors of the Old Continent. 

So yes, China has not cut ties with the Europeans; on the contrary, it is enjoying their situation of energy, economic and military precarity, thus being able to more easily increase its commercial and technological presence there. And the sabotage of Nord Stream linking Russia to Germany is a real blessing for its part since the neutralization of the gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea is redirecting part of the Russian gas flows towards its territory, which is still greedy for energy resources.

Finally, let us emphasize that two diplomatic victories are to China's credit.
First, the 12-point peace plan of February 24, 2023 was above all diplomatically skillful despite its apparent failure. In the eyes of the world, China was seen as a peacemaker to the detriment of the West, who did little to hide their involvement in the conflict through the flow of financial, material and personnel and the abundance of verbal tartarinades. It is therefore a symbolic victory on the international level that Beijing can boast of. It is worth noting with interest point 11 relating to the stability of industrial and supply chains.
Second, the Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement of March 10, 2023 was celebrated under the aegis of Chinese mediation. Here again, the United States, traditional allies of the Saud dynasty, seemed totally absent from the process. It is true that the decision by Riyadh and Beijing to denominate a maximum of bilateral transactions in Renminbi (or Yuan) since 2022 attests to this now ostentatious trust.
This part of Vladimir Putin's speech from 2007 at the Munich Security Conference resonates heavily to this day:
"Madam Chancellor has already mentioned it. The combined GDP measured in purchasing power parity of countries like India and China is already higher than that of the United States. And a similar calculation with the GDP of the BRIC countries - Brazil, Russia, India and China - exceeds the combined GDP of the EU. And according to experts, this gap will only increase in the future... There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new poles of global economic growth will inevitably turn into political influence and strengthen multipolarity." 

In conclusion, in light of recent events, one could sum up the approach to world affairs as follows : the Chinese are Go players, the Russians are chess players, the Americans are poker players and the Europeans are dice players.